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Abstract
By investigating into collective bargaining in Austria, we show that bargaining - two oppos-
ing parties negotiating a deal - may take the form of a temporal organization and further, that 
outcomes of bargaining may significantly be affected by this. We specifically analyze the hier-
archy, structure, membership, common goal and common identity of the bargaining organiza-
tion, as well as its temporal and rhythmic nature. Together this establishes a temporal organi-
zation in contrast to bargaining between clearly separated parties. We discuss this as a possible 
explanation for the widely acknowledged success of the Austrian “Sozialpartnerschaft”.
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While the label temporary organization is frequently used as synonymously with project 
based organizing (Jacobsson, Lundin, & Söderholm, 2016; Packendorff, 1995), this paper ex-
plores temporal organization which has little resemblance with traditional projects. We ar-
gue in this paper that a bargaining process, entered by two opposing parties with diverging 
interests, may take the form of a temporal organization. First, this is all but trivial, because 
bargaining or negotiating is usually hardly seen as an organization. Still, we will show that 
the special case of collective bargaining as it is undertaken each fall in Austria as “Fall Wage 
Round” (Herbstlohnrunde), and which is considered as an essential part of its “Sozialpartner-
schaft” (Social Partnership), fulfils the criteria of a temporary organization. Second, the major 
aim of this paper is to show further that the nature of collective bargaining as a temporary 
organization to a large extent shapes the process and the outcomes of bargaining. For the case 
in particular we will argue how this contributes to the explanation of the widely appreciated 
success of the Austrian “Sozialpartnerschaft”. The research of this paper is based mainly on 
interviews with union representatives who regularly participate in these bargaining processes, 
supplemented through documents describing the roles of negotiating parties, and on papers 
of the Austrian “Sozialpartnerschaft”. The paper proceeds as follows: In the first two sections 
we give a coarse description of the yearly bargaining process called “Herbstlohnrunde” (Fall 
Wage Round), its motivation, and it’s embedding within the system of Austrian “Sozialpart-
nerschaft”. The third and main section of the paper gives a detailed account of those aspects 
of this process which surface in interviews to show its nature as a temporal organization and 
which provide explanations for the outcomes of these bargaining processes. Finally, we discuss 
the wider impact of these results.
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Why bargain collectively?
First, from a pure labour market perspective employers and employees should negotiate 
salaries and working conditions on an individual basis. An economic perspective would ex-
plain the engagement in collective bargaining based on transaction costs, which should be 
expected to be lower if negotiation takes place for a larger group instead between individuals. 
Studies so far examined the impact of different bargaining regimes on firm-level profits (Doe-
llgast, Holtgrewe, & Deery, 2009; Lucifora & Origo, 2015; Rusinek & Rycx, 2013), the effects 
of unions on wages (Fitzenberger, Kohn, & Lembcke, 2013; Frandsen, 2016), flexibility (Kahn, 
2012), and compared public and private sectors (Lewin, Keefe, & Kochan, 2012). Because, 
however, collective bargaining has been rather seen as motivated through the possibility to 
increase the power of employees if they act as a group instead of individuals, the resulting 
salaries are expected to be higher and therefore employers should avoid such a setting. This is 
also captured in the standard economic model of unions as monopoly suppliers of labour vis-
à-vis the employer who has only the possibility to set the level of employment (the so-called 
Leontief-Model, Leontief, 1946). Indeed experience and frequent media reports suggest that 
employers often have less interest in engaging in collective bargaining than employees, espe-
cially if organized in unions. These views are surprisingly little contested, neither in research, 
nor in political discourse, with some exceptions. For example, a more differentiated view on 
unions distinguishes two possible approaches of unions in bargaining processes: rent extrac-
tion versus rent creation (Freeman & Medoff, 1979). In a mathematical representation Aidt 
& Sena (2005) show that unions engage more in rent creation instead of rent extraction the 
higher product competition and the lower labour market competition is. As a consequence 
employers might even have an incentive to invest into unions if their initial resource base 
is low. Recent empirical studies support this view: German firms with work councils show 
higher productivity than their counterparts (Müller, 2012) and collective bargaining seems 
to reduce rent extraction of US-American government employees (Lewin et al., 2012). This 
suggests certain conditions (e.g. product competition instead of labour market competition) 
under which investment into collective bargaining instead of individual bargaining might also 
serve the interest of employers, in addition to reducing transaction costs. 
The structure of collective bargaining processes
A rough description of collective bargaining structures across Europe has been given already 
by Bairstow (1980) and is updated in few recent studies (Lucifora & Origo, 2015), because the 
diversity of structures described in the 1980s has changed surprisingly little since then, which 
might explain the lack of recent research into this. Also, despite a vivid scientific community 
concerned with Industrial Relations which also studies these bargaining structures extensively 
in relation to its inputs (e.g. interests, stakes) and outputs (e.g. wages, working conditions), 
in-depth studies into these structures and the corresponding bargaining processes from an 
organizational perspective seem to be lacking. This paucity of research is even more surprising 
given the relevance of outcomes from these bargaining structures. They significantly impact 
the labour costs both for individual organizations, for governments and the wealth level of a 
large portion of the work force. As one contribution to fill this gap and as a foundation for 
identifying its organizational nature we describe in the following in detail the structure of this 
process as it surfaces each year in Austria.
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“Sozialpartnerschaft” as the Foundation for Yearly “Fall Wage Round”
We start this study by describing the larger context of the process of collective bargaining in 
Austria. Temporary organizations are often embedded in a wider context of recurring patterns 
of cooperation (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006). As a response to experiences before World 
War II and to secure economic stability afterwards, Austria’s four major economic interest 
groups – the Trade Union Federation (ÖGB), the Federal Chamber of Commerce (WKÖ), 
the Federal Chamber of Labour (BAK) and the Chambers of Agriculture (LK) – agreed to es-
tablish a system of cooperation, which later became to be known as the “Sozialpartnerschaft” 
(social partnership). A similar system has been established for example in Germany (Haipeter, 
2012). Still, this system remained informal in the sense that it is not regulated by any law. 
Membership in the Chamber of Labour is mandatory for all employees working in Austria 
whereas membership in labour unions (ÖGB) is voluntary. The Chamber of Labour and the 
trade union federation (ÖGB) are connected through a strong liaison (Mire, 1977). Together 
they represent the interests of employees in the system of Social Partnership in Austria. On the 
opposing side the interests of Austrian business communities are represented by the Austrian 
Federal Chamber of Commerce, where membership of all Austrian companies in operation 
is compulsory. Finally, the farming community is represented by the Chamber of Agriculture. 
Membership there is also compulsory.
Beside the yearly bargaining of collective agreements, the Austrian Social Partnership holds 
a strong influence in practically all areas of economic and social policy in consequence of the 
strong political pillarization (Traxler/Pernicka, 2007), thereby providing it with a role beyond 
mere negotiation. The heads of the chamber of commerce and of labour as well as the union 
leaders are “… very influential in the process of shaping new laws before they were negotiated 
at a parliamentary level” (Lehner/Dikany, 2003; p. 218). In administration the social partners 
are represented in numerous committees, commissions and advisory boards (Karlhofer, 2001). 
Formerly the Parity Commission (Paritätische Kommission) – consisting of top representa-
tives of the government and the four major interest groups – dealt mainly with price controls 
and fighting inflation. Nowadays this institution serves as a forum for dialogue between social 
partners and the government in important economic and social issues. 
The Social Partnership works through the Parity Commission and its four institutional sub-
committees (Sozialpartnerabkommen, 1992; Die österreichische Sozialpartnerschaft, 2013):
• The Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs (Beirat für Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
fragen): On behalf of the four presidents of the interest groups this committee studies 
economic and social issues and develops consensus recommendations. It is organized 
in task forces with appropriate experts from all areas of academia and business.
• The Subcommittee on Wages is responsible for the release of collective bargaining with 
the aim of the temporal coordination of collective agreements.
• The Subcommittee on Competition and Prices: In the post-war period this committee was 
responsible for approving price increases for most goods and services. Today it is an 
instrument for monitoring competition with the aim of preventing overcharging due to 
dominant market positions.
• The Subcommittee on International Issues deals with international development in areas 
relevant to the policy areas of the social partners. The representatives of the four interest 
groups jointly evaluate international processes to facilitate participation and coordina-
tion in discussions and decisions in international institutions.
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The Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) is subdivided into seven smaller affiliated trade unions. 
The membership in the trade unions is voluntary. In 2010 about 37 percent of the 3,26 mil-
lion wage earners are union members (Arbeiterkammer, 2011) and is slightly decreasing since 
then. Although the Austrian trade unions have been facing massive declines in members since 
the 1970s the union remains a powerful institution in the Austrian socio-political system. 
They have institutional power resources, such as collective bargaining and institutional incen-
tives from the Government and employers (Pernicka/Stern, 2011). 
Once a year, collective bargaining between trade unions and entrepreneurial associations 
takes place where minimum wages, working time, and working conditions are negotiated (Ra-
gacs, 2008), which is called “Herbstlohnrunde” (Fall Wage Round). On the side of labour the 
negotiations are conducted by the respective trade union and on the part of the employer by 
the respective branch subunits (Traxler/Brandl/Glassner, 2008). In Austria these yearly col-
lective bargaining processes enjoy a lot of attention. In autumn this process is always started 
by the metal industry. As pattern setter this branch specifies the direction for all further ne-
gotiations. Depending on the differences in the demands of the trade union and employers’ 
willingness to meet these demands, the negotiations can take several laps and can thus take 
different lengths. The results of the negotiations have to be submitted to the Subcommittee on 
Wages and further to the Parity Commission. The agreements are valid for all employees of 
the specific industry, even if they are not union members. Overall, although its importance 
decreased in recent decades in many areas, its influence in the economic and social policy is 
still strong (Karlhofer, 2007).
The Organization: Membership, Hierarchy, and Bargaining Rounds
In the following we describe the organization of the yearly “Fall Wage Round” in Austria 
based on four interviews we conducted with representatives regularly participating in collec-
tive bargaining. By this we aim to show that collective bargaining indeed fulfils the criteria of 
a temporary organization, despite being different from other forms of organizations which are 
usually considered under this label, such as project organizations. The most general definition 
of temporal organizations is “a set of organizational actors working together on a complex 
task over a limited period of time” (Bakker, 2010; p. 468). In the following we structure the 
description along the most central aspects which are usually seen as defining organizations: 
Membership, coordination, hierarchy, and goals.
Structure and Hierarchy of the “Fall Wage Round”
Generally, collective bargaining in Austria is organized around rather broad industries, 
such as metal, finance, or public services. Although these industries differ in some details 
of their bargaining organizations, the general principles are the same. As in any bargaining 
processes there are essentially two negotiating parties involved: the workers’ representatives 
and the businesses’ representatives. The general way these representatives are chosen has been 
described above. We will discuss significant variations in the sub-section on membership. In 
any case, this leads to the two most basic parts of the bargaining organization, which represent 
the two negotiating parties. Overlapping these parts, there is a clear hierarchy (Figure 1). On 
the basic-level there is a group of 15 persons for each party (in the case of Interview 1) or about 
100 persons (in the case of Interview 3). This group discusses on a coarse level to exchange the 
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general position of each party and its information base (e.g. calculated inflation rate, produc-
tivity increase during last years, and economic forecasts for the next year).
Figure 1: Structure of the Bargaining Organization (Example: Metal Industry)
From this larger group smaller groups are formed (located in a different building) to discuss 
more details. When finishing a certain agenda, these groups report back to the larger group 
(“.. well, our judgment is, we are now there and we could come to … “, Interview 3). This com-
prises the first level of hierarchy. In the case of Interview 3 there are three levels of groups (top, 
middle, bottom level with small working groups, with 8 members). The results are collected 
“ … like a cascade from these negotiating teams” (Interview 3). The top of the hierarchy is 
formed through the two teams of the leaders of negotiating parties. While the structure of this 
hierarchy differs slightly between different industries, it remains rather constant from one year 
to the next within specific industry rounds.
Although the structure of the bargaining process is designed as a three-level hierarchy, the 
bottom level plays a very powerful role in the whole process. “No decision is made in the mid-
dle or top level without the consent of the bottom level …” (Interview 4). The large negotiating 
committee at the bottom of this bargaining hierarchy is “… the decision-making body that 
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can actually agree for the entire union …” (Interview 3). The main negotiators report continu-
ously to the bottom team, because “…they are the ones who will ultimately have to give the 
“Sanctus”[“ok”] at the end …” (Interview 1).
The importance of the annual bargaining process for both the employers and the employees 
in Austria is shown even more clearly when the existing hierarchy has to be supplemented 
through an additional top level. The 2012 bargaining of the Finance industry was unsuccessful 
after 6 rounds. As interviewee 1 outlined this situation “… there was no positive outcome after 
6 rounds of negotiating and the situation was quite serious … then it was the chief negotiator 
of the employer side who said ‘let´s try it again’,…”. There was no further negotiation round, 
but a summit meeting of the top leaders of both sides, because to leave the negotiating table 
without a common result is considered as a “no go”.
Membership
Members are delegated by the two negotiating parties. “This is always coordinated and elic-
ited, every year again” (Interview 3). However, fluctuation is rather low, especially in the case 
of employees’ representatives. Therefore many members have several years of experience in 
participating in these bargaining processes, are well informed about the traditions of the proc-
esses and secure some stability in regard to these processes. The most significant threats to 
these traditions are changes at the top of the hierarchy, especially when a leader of one party is 
replaced through somebody who did not participate before. Otherwise, the usual fluctuation 
in membership does hardly impact the processes.
Although negotiations do not take place at the bottom level, the committees at this level are 
called ` negotiating committees´. In the large negotiation committee of the employees there are 
representatives of the works council of big and also smaller companies who are nominated by 
their trade unions. This is the decision making body for the entire union. “You need this com-
mittee that can in fact say “Yes” or “No” to the outcomes of the bargaining process or say “No, 
go on bargaining.” (Interview 3)
The most severe impact on the process and its outcomes seems to be caused through the 
selection of members by employers. The employers’ associations delegates usually either are 
managers of large corporations (instead of owners) or, even more frequently, owners of small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). On the one hand, this reflects the nature of the Aus-
trian economy as being dominated through SMEs, but, on the other hand, does not represent 
the fact that the few large corporation employ the majority of workers in Austria. Also, as the 
following shows, much power is exercised by managers of large corporations.
Especially at the midsize negotiating level (see Figure 1), the composition of the two teams 
differs in a significant way: the employee side is composed of representatives of larger compa-
nies with unionisation. In the midsize employer’s team there are often representatives of small 
and medium-sized enterprises which have no or only weak union representation within their 
companies. This results in bargaining between union-representatives from big companies 
and employer representatives of small and medium-sized companies who have very different 
needs, compared to large organizations. 
“The difficulty is actually that in the negotiating bodies of the employers there are persons who 
do not belong there. Large companies are not represented by its directors or board members. Ei-
ther they send someone from the 2nd or 3rd hierarchy level or, as it was in recent years, the chief 
negotiators for the employers come from small and medium-sized businesses.” (Interview  4). 
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According to this interviewee the main reason for selecting owners of SMEs is of tactical 
nature: “ .. the result which those [SMEs] achieve will not harm us [the larger firms] neither, 
this we can easily take. If it fits them [SMEs] then it will surely fit us also [larger corporation] 
(Interview 4). Thus, in bargaining terms, the selection of delegated members to the bargaining 
organization is implicitly setting a reservation point which needs not to be expressed explicitly 
and, more important, needs not to be enforced otherwise during the bargaining process.
Common goal and identity
When narrating on these bargaining rounds, all interviewees (except interview 4 for which 
this interpretation was not that clear) often used the first person plural, thereby referring not 
only to one party but to all participants: “ ... there are these negotiating teams … “, and “ … we 
go reporting … “. When talking about the negotiation rounds and the way bottom, middle, and 
top layer teams are interacting interviewees always are talking about the teams as a whole and no 
longer about negotiating parties (employees versus business owners). For example when explain-
ing how the result of a discussion is communicated to the top level one interviewee indicated 
that they report the result as:  “ … our judgment is …”(Interview 3) or if there is a deadlock they 
would say  “ ... today we get to nowhere anyway” (Interview 3). Negotiating within these teams 
is often described with the metaphor of a “game”, because,  for example, “ … in fact we all know 
how high the inflation rate is …. “ (Interview 1). Sometimes important outsiders are involved in 
the negotiations which is also interpreted as such: “… that are such rituals, one knows already 
and also the other party knows, that we know. That are these games” (Interview 2), or “… the 
usual games” (Interview 3). On the other hand, there is a common goal and there is a common 
agreement that “ … one should not start this game of winning versus losing” (Interview 2). 
However, these “games” involve also a lot of tactics such as a kind of chicken game: “There is 
always the question, who starts with actually stating a concrete percentage figure” (Interview 3). 
Of course, goals of the two parties are different in the sense that representatives of employees 
aim at high increases of salaries versus rather low increases as the goal for business representa-
tives. However, when one interviewee (3) sayed: “The goal is “wage increases”, well the big goal, 
always”, then she does not even mention this divergence but only refers to wage increases. While 
interviewee 4 used “we” more for union than for the bargaining organization, the reference to the 
common goal of the latter was also dominant for interviewee 4.
Temporal Nature
All of the bargaining organizations are temporal and restricted to a certain time during each 
year’s fall. Usually they live no longer than one month, surfacing in four to six rounds of nego-
tiations. It follows a rather traditional staging, with the first round of negotiations only    “ … 
to talk not about numbers, but only about the framing law” (Interview 3) and to exchange the 
views about the developments of the economy. After this initial discussion at least two rounds 
of negotiations follow. Also, within these rounds, there is a staging of smaller discussion rounds 
within different levels of the hierarchy and of breaks in between which allow for more informal 
information, coordination, and negotiation: “… all of this has a little tradition” (Interview 3). The 
organization, however, always has an end, even if it fails to come up with an agreement. In this 
rather infrequent case, the bargaining organization is replaced through two organizations on 
each side, managing strikes and negotiations to end the strike. This case is indeed seen as a failure 
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for the temporal organization and it is a central goal of this organization to avoid this. Therefore, 
the very last round of negotiations often lasts long hours, extending much into the morning of 
the next day: “ …  it was in the year 2011, there we had a deal at 5 in the morning” (Interview 
1). Here, the pressure of the deadline is working, a phenomenon which is regularly observed in 
project organizations and which is often seen as a central motivational force in projects in gen-
eral (Hughes, 1998) and in theatre staging projects especially (Lehner, 2009). 
Rhythmic iteration
In addition to its temporal nature the fact that it is done in a rather clear yearly rhythm 
also seems to explain some aspects of the bargaining process, which is in accordance to some 
results on improvising organizations (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Lehner, 2004), especially 
in regard to rhythm as a coordinating mechanism. First, because all involved parties know 
that, for example, the first round of negotiations will start in early September for the metal 
industry, the bargaining organizations can start in a rather smooth fashion without much ad-
ditional coordination need. Second, the above described staging also follows the same ritual 
every year, only to be broken if some additional drama is required. Third, the sequence of 
subsequent negotiations for other industries is also prescribed and follows the same rhythm 
every year, again substituting any other form of coordination. Also, the media following these 
negotiations know in advance where to focus their attention to and whome to approach for 
background information, thereby contributing to the staging of the whole process. The latter 
will be shown additionally in the next subsection.
Identity versus Image of the Organization: Media Coverage
As it has been suggested already above and through some interview cites, the bargaining 
process has similarities to the staging of a theatre drama, where the acting of the members 
of the bargaining organization often is motivated through the presence of the general public 
via media coverage. This is represented in the interviews only indirectly (e.g. through refer-
ences to “games” and “plays”), but is well documented in media archives. For example, be-
fore the start of the 2012 collective bargaining (starting in September) process, already in July 
the Austrian media reported about the threat of the industry representatives to split up the 
general bargaining into smaller bargaining processes, likely motivated through above cited 
economic considerations. Then, right before the start of the actual bargaining process and 
before the temporal organization is started, the opposing parties communicate their initial 
position in the media (August). During this pre-bargaining phase, in the media the differences 
between negotiating parties are emphasized (e.g. “Der Standard”, 26 September 2012: “Battle-
lines after second round of negotiations stuck”, termination of negotiations by end of October 
in 2016), presenting an image of a strong conflict, which does not appear in interviews, and 
which is interpreted by commentators frequently as staged drama (e.g. “ … this yearly theatre 
play”, Schuh in “Der Standard, 27 Oct 2016), which in most cases results in a “happy ending” 
one month later (e.g. in 2016 all rounds were successfully concluded in the beginning of No-
vember). This suggests that to some extent media facilitate the externalization of conflict as a 
drama for the outside world and that this helps to maintain the organization within. Finally, 
however, the “happy end” after “a 17-hour bargaining-marathon” is also reported (17 October 
2013, “Der Standard”: “… with this both sides saving their faces came out of a stuck situation”). 
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This can be interpreted as a certain interaction between outside image of the organization 
(media coverage of bargaining process) and internal identity of the temporal organization as it 
is theorized by Hatch and Schultz (2002). They propose that a perceived misrepresentation of 
the organization in the outside image may either lead to mirroring of the outside image or by 
the urge to impress the outside world. The fact that in the very most cases of collective bargain-
ing conflicts have been resolved at the end of the bargaining process suggests clearly the latter. 
It seems that the more media report on “stuck negotiations” and “severe conflicts” between the 
negotiating parties the more the common identity is fostered to finally deliver an agreement.
Discussion
The organization vis-a-vis other arrangements
To summarize, the collective bargaining process in Austria, surfacing as “Fall Wage Rounds” 
clearly fulfils all criteria of a temporary organization, outlined by Packendorff (1995) and in 
more recent reviews (Bakker, 2010; Burke & Morley, 2016): a non-routine process to deliver a 
non-routine product; finite life-span; clear goal on which performance can be measured; and 
consciously organized. This, however, requires some qualification. 
First, as it is the case for many projects, the bargaining process represents also a form of 
routine, because, as the paper shows, it occurs every year in a rhythmic fashion and there-
fore to some extant in a routine manner. The latter fact acts like an anchor for enabling both 
coordination and improvisation around a structure which can also be interpreted as a semi-
structure (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). Second, the common goal of reaching an agreement 
overshadows the diverging goals of negotiating parties. Again, this is not unique to this 
kind of bargaining organizations but a frequently observed phenomenon in any organiza-
tion, especially if they are characterized as political arenas  (Mintzberg, 1985). Third, it is 
consciously organized in the sense that there is a strong expectation each year for negotiat-
ing parties to gather in a certain way, with a defined hierarchy, structure and coordination. 
However, members would hardly describe it as an organization (or associated expressions 
such as “association”, “firm”). The organization is expressed only indirectly through refer-
ring to a “we” (in most interviews), which is usually not there, but only within its temporal 
existences. Thus, collective bargaining is a temporally limited process embedded in more 
permanent and enduring contexts with institutionalised structures (Sydow et al., 2004). 
From an economic perspective the organization is considered as an alternative governance 
mechanism to the market. Once market participants, however, have decided to engage in 
bargaining the market forces are already suspended, at least for some time. From this per-
spective, bargaining is always an intermediary state between market and organization. Still, 
according to a classical economic perspective, the outcomes of the bargaining process will 
be largely determined through market forces, essentially through supply and demand. Bar-
gaining in this sense is restricted to exchanges of information about the relative market 
power of bargaining partners. Collective bargaining can be considered to represent the next 
level of suspending the market, because in essence collective bargaining is a form of (legal) 
collusion. This means that market forces are not only suspended temporarily but are re-
stricted to limited areas, such as variations of salaries only above a minimum level. In the 
following we shall describe the consequences of this by discussing different possibilities to 
fill the void, with a special focus of the temporary organization as one of these possibilities.
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Consequences
In traditional bargaining, with purely opposing negotiating parties, both parties cognitively 
have to refer to their market power which they deliberately gave up. This implies an inherent 
contradiction. Parties negotiate “as if ” they had market power. To show their power they will 
likely refer to strikes which is, of course, only an emulation of market forces and, essentially, 
hurts both parties to some extent. In contrast, when bargaining is exercised within a tempo-
rary organization, the prime frame of reference is the common goal of both parties, which is, 
for example, to come to an end as quickly and as smoothly as possible.
Because members of this temporal organization represent different organizations (employer 
association, unions etc.) this could also be viewed as a temporal meta-organization (Ahrne & 
Brunsson, 2008). However, the interviews of this research suggest a different perspective. Al-
though all members keep their identities as representatives of either employees or employers, 
this identity moves into the background throughout the existence of the temporal organiza-
tion. This resembles the departmental identities (production, marketing etc.) which are always 
present in any organization.
The impact of this organization and the fact that it is indeed a temporary organization as op-
posed to just a negotiation dyad is best represented through the threat of dismissing it, which 
was indeed issued in 2012 by the representatives of the business side. Business representatives 
posed this threat because they saw a chance to have lower increases of wages possible if these 
negotiations were done on a business level and more in terms of market negotiations. How-
ever, even for them it was clear that the chances for strikes and the variances of outcomes of 
negotiations would be higher without the traditional bargaining organization. Therefore, the 
following conclusion seems straightforward. To organize collective bargaining as a temporary 
organization, as it has been described in this paper, stabilizes and reduces the variance of bar-
gaining outcomes. In other words, as any organization, the collective bargaining in the form of 
a temporary organization reduces uncertainty. This is favourable for agents who do not have 
the possibility for coping with uncertainty by diversification, as it is the case, of course, more 
for workers than for business owners. Also, the more business owners enact possibilities for di-
versifying risk, such as producing in different countries, thereby diversifying between different 
institutional arrangements, the less incentive they will see in participating in the temporary 
organization. 
As such, the temporary organization is competing against other institutional arrangements, 
also within the country. In fact, during the last decade, a more or less explicit political dis-
cussion has been going on in Austria, questioning the overall “Sozialpartnerschaft” and the 
corresponding “Fall Wage Round”. As it has been shown in this paper, the organization also 
provides the possibilities for its members to pursue the individual goals of its members. At the 
same time, this poses incentives for outsiders to combat the organization and to question its 
legitimacy.
Organizational research so far has mainly compared temporary organization to permanent 
organization and has focussed on the impact of its temporariness (Bakker, 2010). Here we 
contrast the temporary organization against mere negotiating on the market place. Therefore, 
this line of research could be augmented also through more general comparisons between 
organizational and market arrangements of exchange, such as transaction cost reasoning (Wil-
liamson, 1981), and the view of organizations as ambiguity and uncertainty reducing tools 
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(Daft & Weick, 1984). Especially the latter is supported by the present research, because col-
lective bargaining as temporary organization clearly seems to reduce the uncertainty about the 
outcomes of bargaining processes.
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